Some of the choices for monetary policy by Neil Wallace
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 
Money and Inflation in 
Colonial Massachusetts  Bruce D. Smith (p. 1) 
Some of the Choices for 
Monetary Policy  Neil Wallace (p. 15) 
1983 Contents  (P. 25) Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review VOL. 8, NO. 1 ISSN 0271-5287 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at improving policymaking 
by the Federal Reserve System and other governmental authorities. 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by Preston J. Miller, Richard M. Todd, and Inga Velde. 
Graphic design by Phil Swenson and typesetting by Barbara Cahlander and Terri Desormey, Graphic Services Department. 
Address requests for additional copies to the Research Department, 
Federal Reserve Bank, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480. 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the Research 
Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1984 
Some of the Choices 




Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
and Professor of Economics 
University of Minnesota 
Almost daily, the Federal Reserve is offered conflicting 
advice about how to conduct monetary policy. Some 
people, such as the members of the Shadow Open Market 
Committee, advise the Fed to gradually slow the growth 
of money and let interest rates take care of themselves. 
Others, such as foreign central bankers, advise the Fed to 
lower interest rates and let money grow as it may. And 
still others, such as the Wall Street Journal and various 
supply-siders, advise the Fed to stabilize commodity 
prices and pay little attention to either money growth or 
interest rates. 
Though conflicting, the advice the Fed receives seems 
to be based on a common view that choosing a monetary 
policy is a technical problem. The presumption seems to 
be that there is a unique best policy for the Fed to follow 
and the Fed's problem is to find it. Those advising the 
Fed seem to see their task as convincing the Fed that their 
particular analysis is the right one. 
This attitude is somewhat hard to understand. Most 
economists agree that the choice of a government policy 
should be based on an analysis of how individual welfare 
is affected and that in general any policy choice results in 
both gainers and losers. How, then, can those advising 
the Fed argue that one particular monetary policy is best? 
Do they think they have found a policy that will benefit 
everyone and harm no one? Or are they arguing for a pol-
icy which they recognize will help some and hurt others 
but which reflects their personal judgement about how 
the interests of different groups should be weighted? 
Considering the state of monetary policy analysis, this 
ambiguity is perhaps not surprising. Until recently, econ-
omists have simply not been able to build models which 
describe how individual welfare is affected by alternative 
monetary policies. Most of the models economists use to 
analyze monetary policies only consider how the Fed's 
actions affect certain aggregate features of the economy; 
they do not directly describe what happens to the indi-
viduals who make up the economy. 
This paper describes a simple model which provides 
a coherent analysis of how monetary policy affects people 
in different circumstances.
1 The model is populated by 
three types of agents: borrowers, lenders, and people who 
hold assets valued in terms of the current price level 
(nominally denominated assets, like currency). A govern-
ment is assumed to run a permanent budget deficit which 
it finances by issuing fiat money and bonds. The mone-
tary policy problem in this model is how to choose paths 
of money and bonds to finance this deficit. 
The model demonstrates that different policy choices 
affect the three types of people differently. In a situation 
like that in the United States today—where the govern-
ment has a large prospective deficit and is a net debtor 
and where the real interest rate is high—the model says 
a more accommodative monetary policy would raise the 
price level but lower rates of inflation and real interest.
2 
Such an outcome, the model says, would make the hold-
'I earlier used this model, a version of Samuelson 1958, to analyze the 
effects of credit controls (Wallace 1980). Here, as in that paper, the analysis 
may be fairly demanding for some readers. It requires familiarity with the 
material presented in an intermediate level (relative) price theory course. 
2These somewhat unusual results are not unprecedented. See Sargent and 
Wallace 1981. 
15 ers of nominally denominated assets worse off and bor-
rowers better off, while lenders could be made either bet-
ter or worse off. 
The particular implications of the model for alterna-
tive monetary policies should be viewed cautiously, for 
they probably could be altered by reasonable changes in 
assumptions. What cannot be easily altered, however, is 
the message that the Fed's task as it selects a monetary 
policy is a difficult one—to weigh conflicting interests. 
The Model 
Here I describe, in detail, the people and the government 
in my model economy, how they behave, and precisely 
what I mean by monetary policy. 
The People 
The people in this model live only two periods. At each 
date t (where t is an integer) a new generation—genera-
tion t—of two-period-lived people appears. Thus, mem-
bers of generation t are in this economy at t and t+1 only, 
and at any date t, the population consists of the members 
of generation t — 1 (who are old at t) and the members of 
generation t (who are young at t). 
At each date, only one good exists. The good that ex-
ists at date t is called the time t good. Each member of 
generation t has preferences about the amounts of the 
time t good and the time / +1 good that she or he would 
like to consume in a lifetime (preferences about lifetime 
consumption bundles). I represent such preferences by an 
indifference curve map of the kind shown in Figure 1. 
Any combination of amounts of time t and time t+1 
goods is on some indifference curve (even though I have 
shown only some of the curves). Each individual mem-
ber of generation t is indifferent among bundles of the 
two goods on the same indifference curve, and (because 
people prefer more goods to less) each prefers bundles on 
higher indifference curves (in the direction of the arrow) 
to bundles on lower indifference curves. 
Each member of generation t also has an income 
stream (an endowment) consisting of some amounts of 
the time t good and the time t+1 good, denoted w{(t) and 
w/(r+1), respectively, for member j of generation t.1 as-
sume that these goods cannot be produced and, in par-
ticular, that the time t good cannot be stored to produce 
the time t+1 good. In other words, unless member j en-
gages in some sort of trade, she or he is stuck with the 
endowment as a lifetime consumption bundle. 
To keep things simple, I assume that different gener-
ations are identical and that there is a limited kind of di-
Figure 1 
The Preferences and Endowments 
of Borrowers and Lenders in Generation t 
versity within each generation. Each generation consists 
of two groups of people. Members of one group, whom 
I call lenders (or savers), are identical and have prefer-
ences and endowments that lead them to want to lend 
(or save) at most rates of return. Members of the other 
group, whom I call borrowers (or dissavers), are also iden-
tical and have preferences and endowments that lead 
them to want to borrow (or dissave) at most rates of re-
turn. As Figure 1 shows, lenders are heavily endowed 
with the time t good and borrowers with the time t+\ 
good, so trades of the two goods between the two groups 
are natural. 
I now describe competitive desired trades of the two 
goods by lenders and borrowers at various terms of trade 
(or rates of exchange). I denote these terms of trade r„ 
which represents the price of the time t good in units of 
the time t+1 good. Equivalently, rt is the discount factor 
for computing the value at time t of the time t+1 good; 
thus, time t wealth of member j of generation t in units 
of the time t good is wj(t) + [w/(f+l)/rj. (Think of rt as 
the gross real rate of interest, gross because it is 1 plus the 
real rate of interest.) The total trades lenders desire as a 
group at each rt can be represented by a market supply 
curve of the time t good, a curve which describes the de-
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sired saving, or lending, of the group heavily endowed 
with the time t good. I denote this supply curve S(r). Sim-
ilarly, the total trades borrowers desire as a group at each 
rt can be represented by a market demand curve for the 
time t good, a curve which describes the desired dissav-
ing, or borrowing, of the group heavily endowed with the 
time t+1 good. I denote this demand curve D(r). 
To find the 5(r) curve, I begin with one of the identical 
lenders. Figure 2 shows how much of the time t good one 
lender wants to trade when rt has a particular value. The 
straight line is the upper boundary of all affordable bun-
dles, the lender's budget, implied by that value of rt. As-
suming that the lender behaves competitively, as a price 
taker, her or his supply of the time t good at the particular 
value of rt is the difference between how much of the good 
the lender has (the lender's endowment) and how much 
of the good the lender wants to consume (the lender's pre-
ferred consumption bundle) at that value of rt. When 
faced with different values of rt, the lender can afford dif-
ferent combinations of the two goods; for a higher rt, for 
example, the lender's budget line tilts as in Figure 3. This 
changes the lender's preferred consumption bundle and 
so her or his desired trades. By facing the lender with dif-
ferent values of r„ then, I can trace out how the lender's 
supply of the time t good depends on rt. Since all lenders 
are identical, the S(r) curve is simply the number of lend-
ers in any generation times the supply of the time t good 
of the individual lender at each rt. The D(r) curve is ob-
tained from an analogous examination of borrowers. Ex-
amples of the resulting S(r) and D(r) curves are shown in 
Figure 4. 
Because generations are identical in this economy, the 
S(r) and D(r) curves describe competitive desired trades 
of lenders and borrowers in every period. The first date 
(the current date or the date when a policy is chosen) is, 
however, special. At t—1, the population of the economy 
consists of the members of generation 0 (the old) and the 
members of generation 1 (the young). The S(r) and D(r) 
curves describe the behavior of the members of genera-
tion 1 and successive generations. But those curves do 
not describe the behavior of generation 0 at t=1. The 
members of generation 0 are assumed to initially own 
among them some time 1 good and some assets, like cur-
rency, that are valued in terms of the current price level 
Figures 2 and 3 
A Lender's Supply of the Time t Good 
Figure 2 For a Particular rt Figure 3 For a Higher rt 
17 Figure 4 
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(nominally denominated assets) which they offer to sell 
in order to be able to consume more of the time 1 good. 
Members of generation 0 act competitively to maximize 
their individual consumption of this good—that is, they 
supply all their assets at whatever is the market price 
(perfectly inelastically). 
From this description of the economy's three groups 
of people, I can deduce how the well-being of the mem-
bers of each group is affected by the value of currency and 
the rates of return they face. The members of generation 
0, the old at the first date, are better off the higher the 
value at time 1 of their assets because the higher is that 
value (the lower the price level) the greater is the amount 
of time 1 consumption they can obtain. From Figure 3, 
it is clear that lenders are better off the higher the rate of 
return that they face and that borrowers are better off the 
lower the rate of return at which they can borrow. (As the 
rate of return changes, the budget line pivots on the en-
dowment point, which lets the individuals reach a higher 
or lower indifference curve, or level of preferred con-
sumption.) My task in this paper is to show how these 
rates of return and the initial value of currency—and so 
these three groups of people—are affected by the choice 
of a government policy. 
The Government 
Since I want to analyze monetary policy, I take as given 
the government's fiscal policy as measured by the path 
of the real deficit net of interest. More precisely, I take as 
given real government expenditures and real taxes (and, 
hence, their difference), with interest payments excluded 
from expenditures. The requirement that any such deficit 
be financed can be represented by the cash flow con-
straint of the combined fiscal and monetary authority 
(comparable to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in 
the United States): 
(1) Gt = pt(Hl+-Ht) + pt(PtBt+l-Bt) 
for all . Here Gt, measured in units of the time t good, 
is the government's real deficit net of interest payments. 
On the right side of equation (1) are two terms, each cor-
responding to a way of financing this deficit: the first 
term is the value in terms of good t of the government's 
addition to the outstanding monetary base (new fiat 
money) and the second term is the value of its addition 
to its outstanding debt (new fiat bonds). Specifically, the 
variables on the right side of (1) are defined this way: 
Ht = the monetary base (or high-powered money) 
that generation t— 1 starts with at time t 
pt = the time t price of a unit of the monetary base 
in units of the time t consumption good 
(\/pt = the time t price level) 
Bt = the nominal face value, in terms of the mone-
tary base, of the maturing government bonds 
owned by members of generation t—1 at t 
Pt = the price at t, in terms of the monetary base, of 
a bond which pays one unit of the monetary 
base at /+1 
(\/Pt = 1 plus the nominal interest rate at t). 
This version of the cash flow constraint assumes for sim-
plicity that all of the government's borrowing and lend-
ing takes the form of one-period nominal discount 
bonds, each bond when issued being a title to one unit of 
the monetary base at the next date. For a given path of 
the real deficit net of interest, a given sequence Gu G2, 
..., G„ for all t^l, I will study how the economy is af-
fected by alternative sequences for Ht+l and Bt+, (choices 
for the paths of base money and bonds, or for open mar-
ket operations) which satisfy equation (1). I label the 
choices of the H{+, and Bt+! sequences monetary policy. 
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Fixing the deficit sequence Gt means that the govern-
ment does not vary either its expenditures or explicit 
taxes in response to different choices for the sequences of 
Ht+ j and Bt+l. This means that government expenditures 
and explicit taxes are assumed to be indexed, or ex-
pressed in real terms. It also means that any decrease in 
government interest payments that accompanies an open 
market purchase of government bonds—such as occurs 
in the United States when the Federal Reserve returns 
the interest payments it receives to the Treasury—is used 
neither to finance additional government expenditures 
nor to reduce other taxes. 
Discussing monetary policy in the sense of open mar-
ket operations would be pointless if the model were not 
consistent with (a) both the monetary base and bonds 
being held and being worth something in terms of the 
consumption good and (b) bonds selling at a discount, 
Pt< 1, so that they bear interest in a way that makes them 
genuinely different from the monetary base. As the 
model stands, it is consistent with (a), but not with (b). 
Elsewhere I have argued that legal restrictions on pri-
vate financial intermediaries are generally necessary for 
nominally denominated default-free securities to bear 
nominal interest rates that are significantly positive and 
for monetary policy to have a role (Wallace 1983). Put 
very briefly, the argument is that, without any such legal 
restrictions, substantial nominal interest rates present a 
profit opportunity which private financial intermediaries 
exploit by buying interest-bearing bonds and selling lia-
bilities (for example, bearer bank notes) that compete 
with base money. If such arbitrage does not make the 
monetary base worthless, then it drives nominal interest 
rates down to a level which just covers its costs (of print-
ing bearer notes, for example). Moreover, if these costs 
are the same for everyone—private intermediaries and 
the government—then different open market policies are 
innocuous. 
To prevent such arbitrage from rendering monetary 
policy meaningless in my model, I assume that a reserve 
requirement is imposed directly on each private lender. 
This means that each lender must hold in the form of 
base money a fraction, A, of any savings (bonds or loans). 
This requirement implies that the gross real return lend-
ers face is not simply the return on the bonds or loans the 
lender buys or makes, but is rather a weighted average 
(denoted r,
a): the quantity X times the gross real return on 
base money (rt
m) plus the quantity (1 — X) times the gross 
real return on bonds or loans (r/). Borrowers (dissavers), 
in contrast, face the same interest rate on their loans as 
does the government on its bonds (r/). As we will see, the 
reserve requirement can produce a significantly positive 
nominal interest rate and an important role for monetary 
policy. 
This kind of reserve requirement is intended to cap-
ture in a simple way the role that legal restrictions on pri-
vate financial intermediaries play in actual economies. It 
accurately describes an economy in which all private 
lending or saving takes the form of bank or financial in-
termediary accounts which have a uniform reserve re-
quirement. If these institutions operate competitively 
and costlessly, then the rate they pay on their liabilities, 
their deposits, is a weighted average of the rate they earn 
on reserves and the rate they earn on loans, the same 
weighted average described above as that facing private 
lenders in my model. 
Equilibrium 
I will be describing how this model economy evolves 
from t= 1 on into the indefinite future under the as-
sumption that it evolves as a perfect foresight competi-
tive equilibrium. Competitive means that people in the 
economy treat prices as beyond their control when they 
choose quantities, behavior assumed above in deriving 
the S(r) and D(r) curves. Perfect foresight in the model 
means that anticipated rates of return on assets equal ac-
tual or realized rates of return or, equivalently, that at 
each date t, t^ 1, the young correctly anticipate the price 
level at the next date. Equilibrium means that all markets 
clear at each date t. 
Market clearing in the model should be thought of as 
a sequence of trades of money and bonds for goods, 
trades which at each date simultaneously satisfy the sup-
plies and demands of people and the government. At 
t= 1, the members of generation 0 (the old at / = 1) own 
Hx + /?„ H\ being the monetary base they carried over 
from the last period and Bx being the face value of the 
government bonds they purchased when they were 
young. They cash in those bonds and offer the sum 
Hx + B\ in exchange for time 1 goods. At the same time, 
the government offers new bonds, B2, and new base 
money, H2 — Hx. In addition, the borrowers of generation 
1 offer their own securities, private IOUs. All of these are 
purchased by the lenders of generation 1 in an equilib-
rium. At the next date, t=2, the borrowers of generation 
1 and the government repay their loans and a new set of 
transactions occurs similar to those at t=1 but, of course, 
19 involving different people. This process is repeated date 
after date. 
The conditions for such market clearing can be ex-
pressed succinctly. 
DEFINITION. Given X, Hx + Bx> 0, and sequences for Gt 
and //,+ 1, an equilibrium consists of sequences for p, Pt, 
rt
m, r\, rt
a, and B[+l that for all satisfy equations (1) 
and 
(2) S(n) - LHjl) = pt(Ht+x + PtBt+ x) 
(3) ra E Xrr + (1 -X)rj 
(4) rr = pt+Jpt 
(5) r\ = pt+JptPt 
(6) r/^rr 
(7) ptHt+x^\S{r?) 
with at least (6) or (7) at equality. 
Equation (2) says that saving evaluated at the weighted 
average of the returns on base money and loans minus 
dissaving, or private borrowing, evaluated at the return 
on loans must equal the value of government liabilities. 
Equations (3), (4), and (5) define the return facing savers 
and contain our perfect foresight assumptions, namely, 
that the returns that determine choices at t match the ac-
tual returns. Inequalities (6) and (7) and the accompa-
nying proviso are related to the reserve requirement. In-
equality (6) says that the return on loans is at least as great 
as that on base money. If it were not, then unlimited 
gains could be made by borrowing and using the proceeds 
to acquire base money, activities which would not violate 
the reserve requirement. That being so, no equilibrium 
can violate (6). Inequality (7) expresses the reserve re-
quirement: the value of base money must be at least as 
great as the established fraction times (gross) saving (or 
the value of the saving that lenders must hold as base 
money). The proviso arises in this way. If r{ > rt
m, then 
wealth maximization implies that lenders hold no more 
than the minimum required amount of base money, 
which is to say that (7) holds at equality. Alternatively, if 
the value of base money exceeds the amount required to 
be held [pt Ht+ x > A,S(r,*)], then wealth maximization im-
plies that the return on base money is as great as the re-
turn on securities, which is (6) at equality. 
Instead of trying to study all equilibria possible in this 
economy, I will assume that the real deficit net of interest, 
Gt, is a nonnegative constant, G, and focus on a small 
subset of equilibria, those for which real variables are 
constant through time. I will call these equilibria, which 
are relatively easy to describe, stationary equilibria. Sta-
tionary equilibria can also be distinguished according to 
whether or not (6) holds at strict inequality. Denoting 
constant values of r,
m and r/, respectively, r
m and r
l, I call 
an equilibrium in which r
l>r
m
 a binding equilibrium 
and one in which r
l= r
m a nonbinding equilibrium, 
where the words binding and nonbinding refer to whether 
or not the reserve requirement is actually constraining 
the choices of lenders. 
The study of stationary equilibria is simplified by not-
ing that in this economy attention can be limited to paths 
of fiat money and bonds, Ht+X and Bt+l, for which the 
ratio Bt+ JHt+ x is a constant, which I denote p. In a bind-
ing stationary equilibrium, the ratio Bt+ JHt+ x is neces-
sarily a constant for all t^l.
3 In a nonbinding stationary 
equilibrium, Bt+ JHt+l need not be constant, but there is 
no harm in assuming that it is. As long as the paths of 
Hl+1 and Bt+x are consistent with a nonbinding stationary 
equilibrium, there are paths with Bt+X/Ht+ x = /?, for some 
P, which are also consistent with the same stationary 
equilibrium. I will limit this monetary policy parameter, 
P, to be greater than — 1.
4 
With the paths of Ht+X and Bt+ x limited in this way, I 
can define a stationary equilibrium as follows. 
DEFINITION. Given X, Hx + Bx > 0, G, and P, a stationary 
3To prove this, divide equation (2) by equation (7) at equality to get 
[S{r«)-D{r
l)]/XS{r
a)=\+(PtBt+x/Ht+x). From equation (3), Pt = rr/r>= 
r
m/r', a constant; thus, +,///,+ , is necessarily a constant. 
4A negative fi for the United States would correspond to a situation in 
which little or no government debt was held outside the Federal Reserve and 
in which the Fed was a creditor to the private sector by way of loans to banks 
and others. 
Note that the reserve requirement, X, and fi are genuinely different policy 
instruments in that the set of (r
m,r') outcomes achievable by varying both X 
and fi cannot be obtained by fixing fi arbitrarily and varying only X. [For 
example, if fi in equation (20) below is set at zero, then equations (19) and 
(20) generate a one-dimensional set of outcomes in the (r
m,r') plane as X is 
varied. By varying both fi and X, a two-dimensional set of outcomes is achiev-
able.] This implies that if alternative stationary equilibria for different settings 
of fi and X are interpreted as generating a three-dimensional utility possibility 
frontier—utilities of the current old, of lenders, and of borrowers—then some 
points achievable by varying both fi and X are not achievable by fixing fi ar-
bitrarily and varying only X. 
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equilibrium consists of scalars (numbers) r
m, r
l, r
a, h, b, 
and p that satisfy 




l) = h + b 
(10) r
a = kr





(12) h ^ XS(r
a) 
(13) G = S(r) - D(r
l) - px{Hx+Bx) 
where either (11) or (12) must hold at equality and where 
h denotes a constant real value of the monetary base, 
ptHt+1, and b denotes a constant real value of government 
bonds, ptPtBt+ 
Note that (8) is a stationary version of the government's 
cash flow constraint, equation (1), and that (13) comes 
from that constraint for the first date, t—1. For constant 
real sequences, this definition and the earlier one are 
equivalent.
5 
Although I am mainly interested in binding stationary 
equilibria, understanding of the model will be enhanced 
by a brief study of nonbinding equilibria. 
Nonbinding Stationary Equilibrium 
Here, by definition, the returns on fiat money and bonds 
are equal, so in determining an equilibrium I seek a com-
mon value of r
m and r
l, which I will call simply r. Ac-
cording to equations (8) and (9), this r must satisfy 
(14) G = (1 -r)[S(r)-D(r)] 
which is one equation in the unknown r. From equation 
(13), this r and px must satisfy 
(15) G = [S(r)-D(r)] - px(Hx+Bx) 
where, recall, Hx+Bx is positive and is a given initial con-
dition—the nominal wealth of the members of genera-
tion 0, the old at the first date. Finally, any r and positive 
Pi satisfying equations (14) and (15) must also satisfy 
equation (12), the reserve requirement.
6 Note that equa-
tion (9) and the definitions of /?, h, and b imply that 
S(r)-D(r) = h(/J+ 1), or h = [S(r)~D(r)]/(P+ 1). Hence, 
equation (12) is satisfied if and only if 
(16) [S(r)-D(r)]/(P+\)^XS(r). 
Since S(r) — D(r) > 0, a sufficiently small /?, one near 
enough to — 1, will imply that (16) is satisfied, while a 
sufficiently large /? will rule that out. 
To summarize, a nonbinding stationary equilibrium 
exists if, given G, there exist an r and a positive px that 
satisfy equations (14) and (15) and if, given /?, condition 
(16) is satisfied. There are, then, two separate reasons 
why such an equilibrium may not exist. One is that, given 
G, S(r) — D(r) may not be large enough at f s that do not 
exceed 1 to satisfy equations (14) and (15). The other is 
that P may be too large to satisfy condition (16). In either 
case, I would look for a binding stationary equilibrium. 
Binding Stationary Equilibrium 
I begin the study of binding equilibria by finding two 
equations in the two rates of return, r
m and r
l, that must 
hold. Since r'> r
m in a binding equilibrium, inequality 
(12) must hold at equality. Substituting from it at equal-
ity and equation (9) into equation (8), I get the first equa-
tion, namely, 
(17) G = (1 -r>»)XS(r°) 
+ (l-rO[(l-W) - D{r% 
The second equation, which is obtained by dividing 
equation (9) by (12) at equality, is 
(18) [S(r°)-D(r
l)]/XS(r°) = 1 + {pr
m/r
l\ 
Since r° = Ar
w + (1 — X)r
l, equations (17) and (18) are 
two equations in two unknowns, r




 satisfying equations (17) and (18) and r
 l^r
m, 
then using that pair I would find px from equation (13). 
A Simple Special Case: Fixed Saving 
Because equations (17) and (18) are complicated for gen-
5Equivalence means that, for given scalars satisfying equations (8H13), 
there are corresponding sequences satisfying (l)-(7) and that, for given con-
stant real sequences satisfying (1H7), there are corresponding scalars satisfy-
ing (8H13). 
6Note that any such r does not exceed 1 and is such that S{r) — LHj) > G 
>0. 
21 eral functions S(r) and D(r\ I will examine in detail only 
a special case—one in which the saving of lenders is a 
constant level, S*, that does not depend on the rate of 
return lenders face.
7 This assumption lets me solve equa-
tion (17) or r
m to get 
(19) r
m = [(kS*-G)/XST] 
+ {(l-r<)[(\-X)S*-D(r<)]/XS*} 
and to solve equation (18) for fir™ to get 
(20) Pr
m = r
l [(1 — X)ST - D(r
1)] / XS\ 
Even though I have now made some very special sim-
plifying assumptions, there remains a range of cases that 
potentially could be studied using equations (19) and 
(20). To narrow my focus further, I make three more as-
sumptions. One involves the size of the deficit. For an 
equilibrium to exist, the real net-of-interest deficit, G, 
must not be so big that it cannot be financed through 
some combination of an inflation tax, the term (1 — r
m)h 
in equation (8), and the earnings on government bonds, 
the term (1 — r
l)b in equation (8). The assumption of 
Figure 5 
Market Supply of and Demand for the 
Time t Good When Saving is Fixed 
constant saving implies a simple (sufficient) condition, 
which I adopt, that assures that G is not too big: the def-
icit is less than the monetary base in a binding equilib-
rium, or G < XS*. This assumption assures that the def-
icit could be financed by issues of base money only, with 
b = 0. Another, less critical assumption concerns the rate 
of return r
1 that would clear the private credit market in 
the absence of government borrowing or lending, that is, 
with 0 = 0. This is the value of r
l which satisfies 
(1 —X)S* = D(r
l). I denote this r' value r* and assume 








 This is to assume that, no matter what /? is, there 
is no nonbinding equilibrium. These assumptions and 
G>0 imply that the locus of pairs (r
m,r
l)
 that satisfy 
equation (19) is as sketched in Figure 6. 
I can study the role of monetary policy in this special 
economy by adding to Figure 6's sketch of equation (19) 
sketches of several loci of pairs (r
m,r
l)
 that satisfy equa-
tion (20)—one for /? < 0, one for /? = 0, and one for p > 0. 
On Figure 6, the corresponding equilibrium values of r
m 
and r
l are labeled as the points E~, E°, and E
+. Note that 
the locus implied by equation (20) passes through the 
horizontal axis at r'= r* and that it swings further to the 
right as P increases. This means that the larger is /?, the 
larger is r
l. Moreover, r
l and px are similarly related: the 
higher is r
l, the higher is /?,, or the lower is the price level 
at t= 1. This follows directly from equation (13) upon 
setting S(r
a) = S*. 
This special economy thus displays some of the dif-
ficult welfare choices policymakers face: the tighter is 
monetary policy (in the form of a larger /?), the worse off 
are borrowers and the better off are the initial holders of 
nominal assets, the members of generation 0. Since there 
is a substantial range where r
m and r
l move in opposite 
directions in response to a larger /?, I cannot determine 
in general how a larger p affects their weighted average, 
r
a, the return facing lenders. 
In several respects, Figure 6—in particular, a position 
like E
+ in Figure 6—seems quite close to the situation 
facing the Federal Reserve today. There is a net-of-inter-
est deficit, G > 0; the government is a net debtor, /? > 0; 
and real interest rates are significantly positive, r
l> l.
8 
7One pair of assumptions that would make S(r) a constant is that lenders 
have no endowment when they are old and that their indifference curves are 
those implied by a utility function of the Cobb-Douglas form. 
8In a growing economy, the relevant comparison is between r
l and 1 plus 
the average growth rate. 
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Figure 6 
Alternative Equilibria When Saving is Fixed 
According to the model, an easing of monetary policy 
from such a position, a decline in fa would lower the real 
interest rate, r
l, and lower the (steady-state) inflation rate. 
According to the model, the main price to be paid for this 
would be a one-time rise in the price level. Considering 
the different ways different types of people would be af-
fected by such changes, the Fed's choices today do, in-
deed, seem difficult. 
Concluding Remarks 
Although the simple model economy I have described 
differs in innumerable ways from the actual economy, it 
does not do so in a way that exaggerates the difficulty of 
the choices facing those who determine monetary policy. 
The specification cannot easily be changed in a plausible 
way so as to produce a monetary policy that will benefit 
everybody. One way to get closer to such unanimity is to 
drop borrowers from the model by assuming that every-
one in each generation is a lender. But such a specifica-
tion seems most implausible. In such a model, there is 
nothing that corresponds to active private credit mar-
kets—to mortgage lending, for example. My model is 
more realistic than that, though it is admittedly simple. 
It has only three types of people, for example, and ab-
stracts entirely from business cycles, from the interna-
tional debt crisis, and from the fact that there are many 
countries whose monetary policies affect one another. 
Despite the minimal diversity of self-interest in the 
model, however, it clearly says that different monetary 
policies affect different people differently. Rather than 
exaggerating the difficulty of the choices facing policy-
makers, therefore, my model almost certainly under-
states it.
9 
^he model can be used to analyze questions other than those I addressed 
here. It can be used to study, for example, the effect of varying the magnitude 
of the reserve requirement or the effect of paying interest on required reserves 
or the effect of giving a special status to government bonds, say, by allowing 
holdings of them to qualify as reserves or by levying a lower reserve require-
ment against holdings of them than against holdings of private securities. 
Although the model can also be used to study fiscal policy, doing so re-
quires additional assumptions. Different levels of explicit taxes, besides im-
plying different levels of G in the obvious way, imply different S(r) and D(r) 
curves. Different levels of real government purchases also imply different Sir) 
and D{r) curves unless these purchases are assumed to provide services the 
quantities of which do not affect the way individuals rank alternative bundles 
of private consumption. 
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